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0. Abstract 
Switzerland introduced managed care options in its social health insurance market in order to 
contain health care expenditures (HCE). These capitated Managed Care plans reduce costs 
through gatekeeping, internal guidelines, promoting generic substitution etc. Given the cost 
benefits of about 62%, the crucial question for both health insurers and the legislator is 
whether MC plans enhance efficiency or benefit from self-selection. Up to now, only one paper 
by Lehmann and Zweifel has analysed this question by applying Swiss data (and appropriate 
econometric tools). Their breakdown of the 62% cost benefit was 40% efficiency gains and 22% 
selection effect.  
Our research applied a matching technique to estimate the efficiency gains. All 55,165 MC pol-
icy holders of a given fund, across 18 different MC plans, formed the starting point. The sam-
ple was divided into 442 risk classes according to demographics, place of residence, chronic 
conditions etc. Out of 900,000 insured within the same fund who did not choose MC plans but 
had identical coverage and free access to providers, we drew “twin samples” of identical size 
and risk structure as the MC plans (according to the 442 risk classes) and calculated their aver-
age HCE. We re-sampled up to 60 times per plan and calculated the average HCE of the 60 
averages. This average of averages was compared with the simple average of HCE in the MC 
plan, yielding the efficiency gain. The same average of averages compared with the simple 
average of all non-MC policy holders living in the same area indicates the selection effect. All 
calculations were done separately for each MC plan and two different years (2006 and 2007). 
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Our approach reveals efficiency gains of only 8.7% (across all plans) and selection effects of 
about 52%. However, the different plans vary substantially, and our analysis also identifies a 
best practice plan with 18.5% efficiency gains. The goal of this study was also to inspire those 
plans below the benchmark to copy the best practice tools of the leading MC plans.  
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1. Managed Care in Switzerland 
In 1990 Switzerland was the first European country to include Managed Care options  in its social 
health insurance system. After an extremely difficult start (cf. Finsterwald 2004), this form of insurance 
continues to grow at a constant rate. In 2008, 30% of the Swiss population (or 2.3 million people) 
opted for a Managed Care contract compared to just 5.3% in 1997 (BAG 2008, & 2009, Tab 11.05). 
While this is still much lower than the documented market penetration in the USA as early as 1995 
(69% MC-insured according to Sommer 1999, p. 31), it is worth noting in this context that an MC con-
tract in Switzerland is an agreement between the insurer and the individual insurance holder, while in 
the USA a major part of the insurance business is handled by employers, which means they are able to 
pave the way for entry to the HMO for a large portion of their workforce.  
What do we mean by Managed Care in the Swiss context? The legislator is extremely liberal in this re-
gard, which means all regulations on the subject of Managed Care can be summarised on one page. 
Within the basic health care insurance that is compulsory for the entire population, premium discounts 
are permitted, provided policy holders limit their choice of doctor by nominating a certain doctor or 
group of doctors as their sole gatekeeper. Insurance holders need a referral from their gatekeeper for all 
non-emergency visits. Otherwise insurers are only obliged to cover health care expenses if the gate-
keepers themselves provide the services or have authorized the referral. Generally the chosen gate-
keeper is the primary care provider (although this is not compulsory).  
Without going into the many incentives for doctors, insurance holders and insurers in any detail, (cf. 
Beck 2009 on that subject), it is fair to say that essentially three types of Managed Care have emerged in 
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Switzerland. These are the group practice (HMO), some of them staffed with independent physicians 
others with physicians employed by the insurer, the general practitioner or family doctor model (equiva-
lent to the IPA), which is a group of legally independent individual practitioners, and the preferred pro-
vider list (PPO), whereby insurance holders are able to choose their gatekeeper from a list of doctors 
specified by the insurer. While HMOs and family doctor models are characterised by cooperative 
agreements between service providers and insurers, such agreements are absent in the list model. This 
has the advantage for the insurer of minimizing negotiation costs with doctors, but also the disadvan-
tage of minimal commitment by individual doctors to the MC model. 
Another distinguishing feature is more relevant to our study. In practice emerged side-by-side models, 
with physicians strongly tied into the financial risk and having to accept budget constraints, and others 
where physicians are bound only by loose or non-existent financial constraints (cf. Beck 2004). Our 
analysis of the effect on profitability focuses on models with budget constraints, or so-called per capita 
funding models, because they are more likely to show cost-saving effects. 
From the outset, Managed Care in Switzerland had two complementary main goals: to “steer” patients 
through their gatekeeper so that healthcare would be optimised in a medical sense while enhancing the 
efficiency of health care provision. In other words, the intention was for good medical care to be pro-
vided more economically, which would in turn justify discounted premiums for basic health insurance. 
However, for the insurer, there is a third motive for offering Managed Care contracts – that of risk 
selection. As long as the acquisition of low risks has a big impact on the level of the insurance pre-
mium, proof of which was provided by van de Ven et al. (2007), it is worthwhile for the insurer to offer 
Risk selection  5/26 
 
Research papers published by the CSS Institute for Empirical Health Economics   
so-called pseudo budget models – i.e. models that allow the insurer to entice good risks by offering 
discounted premiums, which means the efficiency effects of Managed Care never come to fruition. 
Insurers are only interested in improving the risk structure of their policy holder base, not in the eco-
nomic savings effects of Managed Care. The 30% market share of MC in Switzerland cited earlier must 
therefore be questioned, since this figure also includes the above-mentioned pseudo budget models. 
The very strict budget models, according to the data pool of santésuisse (as at 30 June 2009), attracted 
248,000 policy holders in 2009 or 3.6% of the compulsory health insurance (CHI) policy holder total. 
(Insurers who pro-actively market such models, however, tend to show much higher percentages. CSS 
Insurance, for instance, is showing 8,4% market share for December 2009 or more than double the 
overall rate (CSS Controlling 2009). 
Now let us turn to the actual object of this study – the question of the profitability of Managed Care 
models. The fact that policy holders of Managed Care models are more economical than those within 
the regular compulsory insurance system was clear from the outset. Table 1 clearly shows that on aver-
age the cost of services used by Managed Care policy holders was without exception lower than that 
incurred by standard policy holders. The cost benefit of MC insured was in between 30% and 58%.  
The crucial question of whether any cost savings can be made through MC or whether the tabled dif-
ferences are simply selection effects, is not an easy one to answer. Experience indicates that MC insur-
ance holders are generally younger and healthier than the average population, (cf. Beck 2004), and for 
that reason alone generate lower than average health care expenditure (HCE). The decision to apply for 
MC models, lies entirely with the policy holders themselves, and their reasons for doing so may be very 
different. New entrants to the MC model therefore represent a classic case of “risk selection”. When 
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strong risk selection occurs, the question also arises as to whether such “healthy” MC policy holders 
facilitate any significant health care savings at all. 
Given the constant increase in health costs, the question is relevant from more than just an economic 
point of view. Insurance holders who opt for an MC model generally receive a discount on the pre-
mium of their CHI of between 15 and 25%. It is also interesting to consider whether the amount of 
such a discount is justifiable – both from the perspective of the health insurers, who would be cannibal-
ising their own premiums if the discounts were too high and their good risks migrated into MC models, 
and also in terms of the solidarity notion behind CHI. The legislator stipulates, for instance, that only 
genuine savings on health services may form the basis of the discount rate. 
In the following study, we first cast an eye on the profitability of Swiss Managed Care models as dis-
cussed in the literature (Section 2) and then move to our own, non-parametric approach. After describ-
ing the model (Section 3) and the data used (Section 4), our findings are presented (Section 5). A critical 
discussion of the resultant insights then completes this research paper. 
 
2. Assessment of profitability in the literature 
A certain contradiction is apparent in the discussion of HMO and family doctor models. On the one 
hand, major savings are cited (25% according to Kocher (1997), possibly 10% to 35% according to 
Weber (1998) and even 30% to 35% according to Baur et al. (1998)), yet two major insurers are with-
drawing from several models and cancelling thousands of policyholders’ discounts on their premiums. 
How can this be explained? 
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There is a range of reasons that might explain why assessment of the cost savings in alternative insur-
ance models leads to contradictory results:  
• The services used by HMO insured were generally compared with those of a similar sample in 
terms of their age, gender and place of residence. This represents an insufficient element of risk 
correction (van de Ven/Ellis 2000). If an HMO applies a strong risk selection policy, or the policy 
holders themselves practise positive self-selection, such a cost comparison leads to over-estimation 
of the savings and simultaneous under-estimation of the selection effect.  
• To avoid this mistake, analysis of so-called switchers was conducted. The costs incurred by MC 
insured in the year before they joined the cost-saving model were compared with the average costs 
of traditionally insured parties. Weber and Cottini (1998) established existing cost benefits of 14%, 
Baur et al. (1998) came up with 40% and Beck (2004) as much as 49%. However, an analysis of 
costs before joining the model alone cannot produce a precise verdict, since such insurance holders 
lose the identified cost benefits due to the regression to the mean over time. Cost comparisons that 
persist in deducting the cost benefit prior to adoption of the model, are thus likely to underesti-
mate the cost-saving effect of Managed Care models. 
• In capitation models, the practice used to be that no invoices of HMO physicians were paid for 
HMO-internal services. These physicians received the total amount of the capitation and had to 
pay their practice costs (salaries, rent, materials etc.) and the bills of downstream service providers 
(specialists and hospitals) out of that total. In order to measure any cost savings of HMO insured, a 
shadow invoice had to be prepared, i.e. the services provided by the HMO were recorded as 
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though they were being billed on a fee-for-service basis, without such documentation ever leading 
to payment of any money.  
As such shadow invoicing did not trigger any payment shadow invoices were frequently forgotten 
or omitted, so shadow invoices tended to be too low. Cost comparisons that compared a compa-
rable sample with the costs of shadow invoices therefore tended to overestimate the cost benefit. 
• A further aspect makes cost comparison even more difficult. In many MC models, policy holders 
did not pay any co-payments, which makes it all the more difficult to compare those model ser-
vices directly with services outside the model, since no precise figure can be attached to the associ-
ated moral hazard effect. 
• Furthermore, from an economic perspective, even correctly calculated cost-saving effects tend to 
underestimate the overall economic effect of MC. An essential element of enhanced efficiency is 
that MC prevents unnecessary hospital admissions. Since 50% of the inpatient costs are subsidized 
by the canton, which means half of the cost never appears on CHI-invoices, the overall cost sav-
ings of MC are systematically underestimated (cf. Sommer 1998).  
All these points must be considered whenever proof is furnished of cost-savings in Managed Care 
models. Without going into the detail of all existing Swiss calculations, it is fair to say that most of 
them overlook at least one of these critical points. 
The study by Lehmann and Zweifel (2004) is worth highlighting. These authors are the only ones who 
make full use of the available economic instruments for risk correction. Using their complicated, multi-
step approach, they come to the conclusion that while all types of models investigated show selection 
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effects (between 18 and 24 percent), innovation effects – including improved profitability – of between 
10 and 40 percent frequently prevail. This very high cost-saving rate of 40% is astonishing. 
In view of the critical points mentioned above, that study probably suffered from shadow invoicing 
bias and the focus on performance effects without factoring in the operating costs. Moreover, Leh-
mann himself was unable to reproduce this high result when applying the principle to other sets of data. 
For this reason, a further profitability analysis is offered here which, unlike the approach of Lehmann 
and Zweifel, takes a non-parametric approach, yet still claims to correct morbidity discrepancies with a 
high level of differentiation, is not based on shadow invoice data but rather on an overall population of 
almost 950,000 policy holders, and also takes into account total implementation costs. 
 
3. Method 
The key question is what percentage of the cost difference between MC and non-MC policy holders is 
based on pure risk selection and what percentage can be attributed to genuine savings on health care 
expenditure (HCE). To establish this, one would have to know which costs the MC sample would gen-
erate, if it in fact were not made up of MC insurance holders. This can be answered by finding a “com-
parative sample” of non-MC policy holders presenting with the same “risk”, i.e. the same morbidity as 
the MC sample. If a perfect comparative sample could be found, the cost difference between this group 
and the MC sample would reveal the exact and genuine cost-saving figure. 
However, since health care expenditure can never be precisely forecast, in practice one can only ever 
approximate the perfect comparative sample. This is done by taking into account the given risk factors 
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of the policy holders (such as age, gender, previous hospital overnights etc.) as accurately as possible. In 
the case of our non-parametric method, a non-MC insured “twin set of data” can be sought for each 
MC-insured person. This set matches all the essential risk factors and thus best represents the HCE risk 
of the MC insured person. Using this procedure, a “twin cohort” can be established with the same risk 
structure as the MC sample. 
If each MC-insured person were only assigned one twin, a point estimation of the cost difference be-
tween the MC sample and the twin sample, and thus an estimate of the real cost-saving, could be calcu-
lated, but no indication of the accuracy of that estimate would be obtained. With a simple bootstrap 
extension of the twin analysis, this problem can be rectified. Initially all kinds of “twin candidates”, i.e. 
non-MC policy holders with the same features, are identified for each MC policy holder. Then, from 
this group, one candidate is randomly selected as the twin. In this way, the twin cohort becomes a ran-
dom sample, and by repeatedly drawing random samples, information about the statistical variance of 
the results emerges. 
These randomly selected samples are the equivalent of virtual MC models with risk structures that 
completely match those of the real MC model. From the set of MC data, we know the average costs 
( MCμ )2. Furthermore, we can calculate the average costs of all non-MC policy holders from the geo-
graphic area of the MC model ( CHIμ ). The repeatedly drawn random samples produce a vector of 
mean values ( TWINSμr ). From the components of this vector, the anticipated value and variance of all 
twin samples can be estimated ( TWINSμ and ). The difference between the average costs of the 2σTWINS
                                                 
2 In further research we will resample MCμ  as well, in order to take the randomness of this variable better into account. 
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twin models and the real models ( MCTWINS μμ − ) determines the cost-saving, while the difference be-
tween the average costs of the twin models and the non-MC policy holders ( TWINSOKP μμ − ) relates to 
the risk selection factor. Based on the , statements of significance about the above two differ-
ences can therefore be made. Based on the calculated cost differences and further information from the 
accounting system, a conclusion can also be drawn about the extent to which the applied MC discounts 
are commercially justifiable. 
2
TWINSσ
 
3.1 The risk groups 
There is a significant amount of literature on the question of how to assign insured to various risk 
groups, so that their individual risk differences can be explained best in a statistical sense. Based on this 
and limited by the available sets of data, the following risk factors were selected in the search for 
“twins”:  
• gender and age group (five-year bands, babies and 1-year-olds dealt with separately) 
• residential region (the twin samples were selected from non-MC insured living in the geographic 
area of the MC model) 
• voluntary chosen level of annual deductible (two groups: up to SFR 1000 and more than SFR 1000 
per year) 
• hospital or nursing home overnights in the previous year (of at least 3 days) 
• medication-based indicators of chronic diseases (21 different pharmaceutical cost groups or PCGs)3 
                                                 
3 According to Lamers and van Vliet (2003) 
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• death in the year of analysis 
 
Groupings were able to be made according to the level of voluntary self-contribution, because Swiss 
CHI allows for various options for annual deductibles. It is known from various studies that the choice 
of the deductible is a good indicator of an individual’s health condition (e.g. Gardiol et al., 2004). 
Choosing the lower annual deductibles tends to indicate a higher risk of illness. 
Factoring in hospital and nursing home overnights relates to the new risk adjuster in the Swiss risk ad-
justment system (Spycher, 2008). Individuals with a prior hospital stay tend to show above-average 
HCEs in the following year.  
A highly positive correlation between imminent death and health care expenditure has been known for 
a very long time (Zweifel et al. 1995).  
To avoid all thousands of possible combinations of factors, for most of them only few twins could ever 
be found, the risk groups were pooled to the extent that, as a general rule, several “twin candidates” 
were available for selection. Despite this, there were still 442 risk groups included in the analysis. 
 
3.2 Forming the twin samples 
The twin samples were formed using a stratified bootstrap procedure. It was based on non-MC insured 
holders who lived within the geographic area of the relevant MC model.  
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The “base sample” of non-MC insured was then divided into the 442 risk groups. Risk groups with 
fewer than 5 individuals were excluded from the analysis as a matter of principle. However, in most 
cases, such exclusion only affected less than 1 percent of the insured.  
Then as many insured from each risk group as were represented in the MC model were randomly 
drawn ("sampling with replacement"). This resulted in a twin sample being created in the form of a 
random sample. 
Repeating this random sampling process produced a series of simulated twin samples, all with the same 
risk structure as the MC insured. Because the procedure for drawing random samples was time-
consuming, the number of samples taken was only in between 30 and 60 twin samples (in a further 
attempt we will enlarge the number of samples). 
 
4. Data pool 
The problem already raised of the shadow invoicing bias inherent in HCE data does not apply here. It 
is true that the MC models examined are based on cooperative agreements between physicians and 
health insurers that require budget responsibility, i.e. before the start of each year, an overall budget 
(including all HMO-external costs such as medication, hospital overnights etc.) is determined for the 
MC insured of a particular model, and this amount may not be exceeded. However, throughout the 
year, the insurer accounts for all services according to the customary fee for service. That means all 
services are recorded in exactly the same way as the services of non-MC insured and also paid out ac-
cordingly. It is not until the end of the year that the total of the fee-for-service HCEs of the MC model 
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are compared to the agreed budget. If HCEs are below budget, the MC model is paid the balance as 
profit. If any over-expenditure has occurred, the MC organisation has to pay back the loss to the insur-
ance company. This guarantees that the data captured both inside and outside the MC model is compa-
rable, and the shadow invoicing or exact profit/loss account at the end of the year has no distorting 
effect on the data pool. 
The data of 2006 and 2007 of all MC models with which the data providing insurer CSS had a capita-
tion agreement in the corresponding year were considered as part of this study. Two smaller HMOs in 
the same city were pooled together within one model. The 2007 analysis thus includes 18 MC models 
with a total of around 55,000 insured and the 2006 analysis includes 11 models with a total of 38,000 
insurance holders. The number of insured in the various models ranged from around 150 to almost 
14,000, although 10 models (2006: 8) had more than 1,000 insured. The sample of non-MC insured, 
from which the respective twin sample were drawn, comprised between 3,300 and 43,000 insured.  
5. Results 
In the first instance, the results for gross HCEs in the treatment year 2007 are presented. The results 
for 2006 and the net HCEs are only referred to occasionally for comparision. 
 
5.1. Strong element of risk selection  
As anticipated, all of the MC models examined showed a strong element of risk selection, i.e. the aver-
age HCE of the simulated twin samples were much lower than that of the non-MC insured (table 2, 
column 3; CHITWINSCHI μμμ /}{ − ). The degree of risk selection in 2007 ranged from 24% to 68%, and in 
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the case of the larger MC models from 35% to 68%. On a weighted average of all models, risk selection 
made up 52.0%, i.e. based on risk selection alone, the average HCE of MC insured were only half those 
of non-MC insured.  
The Swiss risk adjustment system equalizes differences in risk structure of the various policy holders 
only partially because it is based only on canton, age and gender (at least until 2012). The degree of risk 
selection after risk adjustment (table 2, column 4) ranges from 17% to 51% (weighted average of all 
models: 30.7%). Risk adjustment therefore only reduces risk selection by about two fifths (from 52% to 
30.7%), and in all models, (with one exception only), more than half of the risk selection remains even 
after risk adjustment. In other words, the insurance holders who opt for an MC model are on average 
not only much younger, but also considerably healthier than other insurance holders. 
At the same time, this analysis illustrates the weakness of the current Swiss risk adjustment system. Un-
der this scheme, a health insurer can theoretically avoid up to a third of HCEs by adopting a policy of 
strategic risk selection alone, i.e. ideally attracting predominantly healthy individuals, without a single 
Swiss Franc less being spent in the health care system overall. 
 
5.2. Significant savings 
In addition to the demonstrated strong degree of risk selection, most MC models still achieve signifi-
cant and real health care savings. These are measured by comparing average MC health care expendi-
ture with that of the twin samples (table 2, column 5; TWINSMCTWINS μμμ /}{ − ). Based on the weighted av-
erage of all MC models, a saving of 18.1% resulted in 2007. Of the ten larger models, eight achieved 
Research papers published by the CSS Institute for Empirical Health Economics   
Risk selection  17/26 
 
significant savings, in both substantive and statistical terms, ranging from 7.9% to 32.5%. Of the eight 
smaller models, four still managed to achieve statistically significant savings, ranging from 8% to 43%. 
In the case of the remaining MC models, no saving above the 5% significance threshold could be 
traced. 
An interesting question would be to what extent the savings depend on the degree of risk selection. 
However, the correlation between size and selection is practically non-existent. This means a well-
functioning network can make considerable savings even when many good risks are enrolled. 
The health care savings of an MC model can also be quantified in another way, i.e. as a saving relative 
to the health care costs of the region. Assume that an MC model were to show 50% risk selection and 
save 10% on health care expenditure. The MC sample therefore still accounts for 40% of the health 
care services compared to the average of the population as a whole. A 10% saving in relation to the 
remaining 50% of health care services “after risk selection” equates to 20%. While in relation to the 
whole population, which means ”before risk selection”, only 10% savings are made.  On the weighted 
average of all MC models, the saving before risk selection in 2007 was 8.7%, while four models posted 
over 10% (table 2, column 7; CHIMCTWINS μμμ /}{ − ).  
 
5.3. Effect on co-payments 
Apart from premium discounts, the real savings documented here in the MC models lead to a further 
monetary benefit for MC insurance holders. As their gross costs for health services are lower than if 
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they were treated outside the model, their total co-payments also drop. Of the average savings resulting 
in 2007 of 18.1%, some 3 percentage points are attributable directly to these lower co-payments. 
 
5.4. Stable results 
Additional analysis of the treatment year 2006 proves that the results described above are stable within 
expected deviations. On the weighted average of all MC models, the overall risk selection for 2006 was 
48.3% (2007: 52.0%), risk selection after risk adjustment was 26.7% (2007: 30.7%), savings amounted 
to 21.3% (2007: 18.1%) and savings before risk selection totalled 11.0% (2007: 8.7%). For 10 out of 11 
MC models, the savings were statistically significant and ranged from 11.5% to 30%. 
 
5.5. Commercially accurate 
In summary, this section deals with the question of whether MC models can also be commercially suc-
cessful for the health insurer – compared to normal CHI coverage. Since, in this instance, the sole fo-
cus of interest is on a comparison between the costs of full CHI coverage (with free access to practitio-
ners) and MC coverage. The results for 2007 are shown as the sum of all analysed MC models and in 
percentages in figure 1. 
MC-related cost-saving effects appear on the “upper half of the figure”. 87.3% of that is attributable to 
risk selection and only 12.7% to actual HCE savings. 
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The MC-related extra expenditure or income shortfall for the insurer appears on the “lower half of 
figure 1”. More than half of that (53.8%) is attributable to higher payments for risk adjustment resulting 
from the extent of risk selection. The income shortfall attributable to premium discounts amounts to 
around 44%, although this figure does not relate solely to MC discounts. Since, in the case of MC mod-
els, the percentage of young people, (who qualify for the appropriate youth discounts), and policy hold-
ers with voluntary high deductibles (who qualify for deductible-related discounts) is above average, 
there is a corresponding income shortfall in comparison with the ordinary CHI coverage. We will re-
turn to the link between the MC and voluntary deductible effects in Section 6 of this paper.  
A CSS-internal analysis by Keiser and Bucher addressed the additional administration costs incurred by 
the insurer in relation to MC models. This involved a comparison of the exact paper trail of MC in-
voices and non-MC invoices. Since MC billing documentation related to invoices outside the MC net-
work, (such as hospital bills and specialist invoices) is only eligible for reimbursement if there is evi-
dence of an appropriate referral from a network physician, the accounting process for MC paperwork 
tends to be longer and more expensive than for other documentation. The analysis revealed that MC 
models indeed lead to additional administrative costs, but that these make up only 0.7% of the total of 
MC-specific effects. 
The total of the cost-saving effects and the total of extra expenditure or income shortfall were almost 
equal in the year 2007. CSS was left with a minor random profit contribution of around 1% of that 
total. In conclusion, it is true to say that when all MC-specific effects are taken into consideration, the 
premium discount accorded MC policy holders is indeed commercially justifiable.  
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6. Interpretation 
Finally, the question arises as to whether the established savings of 8.7% before risk selection (table 2) 
are a matter of major or minor savings effects.  
At first glance, after 19 years of experience with these models, one has to admit in all honesty that sav-
ings effects of less than 10% seem disappointingly low. However, this first impression has to be put 
into perspective, as follows: 
Such savings should not be underestimated, since they recur on an annual basis. Many other cost-
cutting measures produce a one-off effect – such as a state-mandated reduction in medication prices or 
a limitation on the number of service providers – and are regularly undermined by substitution strate-
gies. The danger of this occurring is less likely in the MC area. Furthermore, the system in the MC do-
main is moving towards enhanced efficiency, which is not necessarily the case for other cost-saving 
measures. 
Economically speaking, the savings effect is higher than it appears here, because half of the savings in 
the in-patient sector do not show up in health insurance data. Unfortunately, the legislator continues to 
directly subsidize 50% of hospital cost, and thereby reduces incentives for insurers to avoid unneces-
sary inpatient stays. 
However, it seems more significant to us that the 8.7% represents an average figure of various models. 
This includes successful and unsuccessful Managed Care providers, some of which even generate nega-
tive saving effects and thus treat patients at greater expense than the traditional system. Optimisation 
on the insurer side will soon lead to an increase in this average figure. Contracts with low performing 
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MC providers will be cancelled. At the same time, insurers have the incentive of steering their custom-
ers towards the best HMO in the area. After all, best practice before risk selection of 18.5% (model 14, 
table 2) is already more than twice as high as the average. 
There is also an incentive to make improvements on the service provider side. They can increase the 
profit generated by their practice if they copy the best-practice HMO treatment style. Moreover, this 
study is the first to come up with a benchmark for the different models to which the different practices 
can respond. Up until now, any such yardstick was completely lacking. 
Referring to 19 years of MC experience does not really give a true picture of the health care market. 
Only very few models are effectively 19 years old. The rate of growth in the number of policy-holders 
in this sample was practically 100% over the past two years, so 50% of those insured today could be 
described as new customers. It is therefore all the more significant that 8.7% of HCE was still able to 
be saved in relation to this relatively healthy and young group of policy holders. 
The risk selection effect will decline when the growth in the number of policy-holders flattens out and 
the population within the MC models naturally ages. It is hardly likely that the majority of those insured 
will withdraw from the MC models in their advanced years – this is not what experience of the older 
models suggests. 
The problem of risk selection profits will also be mitigated by the upcoming reform of the risk adjust-
ment system (2012). This will lead to diminishing selection profits, because payment via the risk ad-
justment system will make a more significant difference. Compulsory insurance providers will generally 
have a stronger incentive to position themselves in the market via effective MC models. 
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Along with risk selection, a third aspect is worthy of consideration. As we have already seen, the pro-
portion of policy holders with voluntary deductibles in the MC models examined in this study is higher 
than in those of the comparable samples. As a general rule, such higher co-payments go hand in hand 
with a reduction in moral hazard. This means that, strictly speaking, not everything that is subsumed 
here under risk selection (table 2) can be attributed solely to differences in morbidity.  In part the con-
tributions are attributable to attitudinal changes of policy holders with high deductibles and are there-
fore economically unproblematic. Quantification of the moral hazard effect, however, goes beyond the 
bounds of this particular study. 
The current study also leaves a few other questions open, such as how the relative differences among 
MC models are to be explained, and what the decisive factors are for determining performance differ-
ences. Future research must also address inter-temporal profit fluctuations within the models. The two-
year horizon has too little to say about this aspect. Furthermore, it is also important to come up with a 
simpler method. The one used here is too time-consuming to be applied on an annual basis to the ever-
increasing number of MC policy holders. 
Even though plenty of questions remain open, this paper takes a step further towards better organiza-
tion of Managed Care in Switzerland. The results may possibly dampen some of the extreme enthusi-
asm and even euphoria associated with the MC movement, but they do offer a reliable starting point 
for ongoing strategic developments in the future.     
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8. Tables and figures 
 
 Table 1: Gross HCEs in basic compulsory health insurance    
HCEs in SFR per policy holder and year Difference Growth rates 
Year 
Managed 
Care Cov-
erage (A) 
Ordinary 
Coverage 
(B) Total (B - A)/ B 
Managed 
Care Cov-
erage 
Ordinary 
Coverage 
1997 917 1741 1570 47% * * 
1998 1188 1749 1646 32% 30% 0%
1999 1323 1944 1710 32% 11% 11%
2000 1387 2062 1816 33% 5% 6%
2001 1476 2215 1916 33% 6% 7%
2002 1636 2337 1987 30% 11% 6%
2003 1455 2544 2080 43% -11% 9%
2004 1373 2758 2209 50% -6% 8%
2005 1428 3046 2334 53% 4% 10%
2006 1372 3255 2349 58% -4% 7%
2007 1456 3503 2444 58% 6% 8%
 
Source: BAG: Statistics for compulsory health insurance (OKP) 2007, Tab. 2.21 (The total encom-
 passes all policy holders incl. those with elective deductibles and insurance bonuses).  
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Table 2: Risk selection and cost-saving in 2007 
HMO 
No. 
Number 
of insured 
Risk selection 
overall 
Risk selection 
after risk ad-
justment 
Savings in 
percent of 
the average 
of the twin 
sample  
Significant 
on the 5% 
level 
Savings in 
percent of the 
population 
average 
1 13,823 55.7% 32.4% 23.3% * 10.3% 
2 9,581 55.7% 32.8% 19.5% * 8.7% 
3 9,334 38.0% 16.6% 18.7% * 11.6% 
4 5,218 52.5% 31.4% 7.9% * 3.7% 
5 4,497 39.6% 27.5% 11.3% * 6.9% 
6 2,883 59.5% 43.3% -1.7% - -0.7% 
7 1,766 54.2% 32.5% 32.5% * 14.9% 
8 1,530 35.1% 23.6% 1.5% - 1.0% 
9 1,200 42.1% 32.4% 16.1% * 9.3% 
10 1,161 68.0% 51.2% 30.5% * 9.8% 
11 978 46.0% 32.9% 8.0% * 4.3% 
12 719 47.3% 31.0% 7.6% - 4.0% 
13 681 58.1% 38.7% 12.8% * 5.4% 
14 594 56.9% 30.1% 42.9% * 18.5% 
15 472 59.6% 35.6% 17.4% * 7.0% 
16 305 64.7% 44.0% 8.1% - 2.9% 
17 274 24.0% 17.3% 0.7% - 0.5% 
18 149 49.5% 29.6% -6.0% - -3.0% 
Total 55,165 52.0% 30.7% 18.1%  8.7% 
 
Key:  Risk selection overall = CHITWINSCHI μμμ /}{ −  
 Saving  = TWINSMCTWINS μμμ /}{ −  
 Saving before risk selection= CHIMCTWINS μμμ /}{ −  
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Figure 1: Total differences in HCE between Managed Care insured on the one hand and CHI-insured 
 with free access to physicians on the other hand.  
 
